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High-level languages like Java or ML support abstraction
and data encapsulation through language features such as mod-
ules, objects, classes, and/or abstract data types. But traditional
compilation does not preserve such abstraction boundaries.
At machine code level, there is just a single address-space
where all code is readable and all data is read/writable. In
other words, the entire high-level program is compiled down
into one single protection domain. To a large extent, this is
the case because the protection domain granularity of modern
execution platforms is very coarse grained: the smallest unit of
protection is an operating system process, and most programs
are compiled to a single process.
For fully safe languages, and if attackers can only provide
input to and read output from programs, there is no need to
preserve abstraction or protection boundaries after compilation:
for such attackers, language safety is sufficient to guarantee
that program abstractions are maintained. However, most com-
piled languages (including for instance C#, Java, Go, and Rust)
are not fully safe: programs can contain unsafe blocks that
might be subject to memory safety errors [1], or programs
can interface with code written in unsafe languages through a
native interface. In addition, attackers may have more powers
than just the abilities to provide input and read output: for
instance, programs might support binary plugins making it
possible for attackers to load arbitrary machine code into a
process, or kernel-level malware can inspect any user process
at the machine code abstraction level. In these circumstances,
mechanisms for protecting source code data encapsulation and
abstractions even after compilation to machine code level are
a valuable additional layer of defense.
Fortunately, in recent years there has been renewed in-
terest in execution platforms that support fine-grained pro-
tection domains. Notable examples include protected module
architectures [2], [3], [4], capability-enhanced processors [5],
or general meta-data tracking processors [6]. The upcoming
Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) [7] will bring such
fine-grained protection to mainstream processors. With the
availability of fine-grained protection domains at machine
code level, researchers have started exploring compilation
techniques that build on such low-level protection to maintain
source code level abstractions at machine code level, even
in the presence of attackers that can perform machine code
injection attacks.
The correctness criterion for such compilation is the notion
of full abstraction [8]. Roughly speaking, compilation is fully
abstract if any attack that an arbitrary machine code context
can do against a compiled module, could also be done by
a source code context of that module based on the source
code semantics. More precisely, the compiler must preserve
and reflect contextual equivalence between its source and
target languages. Two modules M1 and M2 are contextually
equivalent M1 ∼ M2 if there is no context C that can
distinguish M1 and M2 in the sense that C[M1] diverges and
C[M2] does not. Compilation is fully abstract if it holds that:
M1 ∼M2 iff JM1K ∼ JM2K with JMK the compilation of M .
In previous work [9], [10], we have proposed fully abstract
compilation techniques for Java-like languages towards an
execution platform with a protected module architecture that
supports a single protected module living in an unprotected
machine code context. One specific source code module M
is compiled to a single machine code level protected moduleJMK with the guarantee that machine code contexts can only
perform attacks against JMK that could also be done by
means of a source code context against M. As a consequence,
this single source code module M is protected against code
injection attacks originating from outside that module.
This paper reports on our ongoing work to generalize this to
compilation schemes that support compilation to multiple pro-
tected modules. Such a generalization is useful. The limitation
to one protected module at run time makes sense in the case
of a safe source level programming language, where only one
module (the run time library) contains native code that could
have memory safety vulnerabilities. In this case, all the safe
source code modules are compiled together in the single target
platform protected module. But as soon as an application has
more than one module that could potentially contain safety
vulnerabilities (or alternatively if some modules could have
been subject to tampering with the compiled version of the
module), the limitation to one target platform protected module
is unsatisfactory. To protect module M1 against exploitation of
safety vulnerabilities within module M2 at run time, JM1K
must be in a different protected module than JM2K. Our
generalization makes it possible to compile each source code
module to a corresponding target platform protected module,
thus limiting the impact of code injection attacks against each
individual module.
It is also a non-trivial generalization, as malicious machine
code contexts can now try to intervene in the interactions
between two protected modules. A concrete example of where
the existing compilation schemes [10] fail, is the way in
which object sharing is handled. Patrignani et al.’s compilation
scheme protects against the context guessing private object
identities by maintaining a table of all objects that have been
shared with the context, and using an index into that table as
the identity of an object outside the protected module. This
protection is insufficient in the multi-module case, as it does
not protect against a scenario where module M1 shares an
object O with M2 but not with M3. JM3K can now guess the
object identity of O and call methods on it, thus breaking full
abstraction.
In this work-in-progress, we investigate the additional
complications that arise for multi-module fully abstract com-
pilation, show how some of the proposed execution platforms
with fine-grained protection lack features needed to support
such compilation, and develop two approaches where the first
one achieves a form of probabilistic full abstraction on SGX-
like systems, and the other one achieves full abstraction on a
specific variant of capability-enhanced hardware.
REFERENCES
[1] Y. Younan, W. Joosen, and F. Piessens, “Runtime countermeasures for
code injection attacks against C and C++ programs,” ACM Computing
Surveys, vol. 44, no. 3, pp. 17:1–17:28, June 2012. [Online]. Available:
https://lirias.kuleuven.be/handle/123456789/288462
[2] J. M. McCune, B. J. Parno, A. Perrig, M. K. Reiter, and H. Isozaki,
“Flicker: an execution infrastructure for TCB minimization,” in Eurosys,
2008.
[3] R. Strackx and F. Piessens, “Fides: Selectively hardening software
application components against kernel-level or process-level malware,”
in Proceedings of the 19th ACM conference on Computer and Com-
munications Security (CCS 2012). ACM Press, October 2012, pp.
2–13.
[4] J. Noorman, P. Agten, W. Daniels, R. Strackx, A. Van Herrewege,
C. Huygens, B. Preneel, I. Verbauwhede, and F. Piessens, “Sancus:
Low-cost trustworthy extensible networked devices with a zero-software
trusted computing base,” in USENIX Security, 2013.
[5] J. Woodruff, R. N. Watson, D. Chisnall, S. W. Moore, J. Anderson,
B. Davis, B. Laurie, P. G. Neumann, R. Norton, and M. Roe, “The
CHERI capability model: Revisiting RISC in an age of risk,” in ISCA,
2014.
[6] U. Dhawan, C. Hritcu, R. Rubin, N. Vasilakis, S. Chiricescu, J. M.
Smith, T. F. Knight, Jr., B. C. Pierce, and A. DeHon, “Architectural
support for software-defined metadata processing,” in ASPLOS, 2015.
[7] F. McKeen, I. Alexandrovich, A. Berenzon, C. V. Rozas, H. Shafi,
V. Shanbhogue, and U. R. Savagaonkar, “Innovative instructions and
software model for isolated execution,” in HASP, 2013.
[8] M. Abadi, “Protection in programming-language translations,” in
ICALP, 1998.
[9] P. Agten, R. Strackx, B. Jacobs, and F. Piessens, “Secure compilation to
modern processors,” in 2012 IEEE 25th Computer Security Foundations
Symposium (CSF 2012). IEEE, August 2012, pp. 171–185.
[10] M. Patrignani, P. Agten, R. Strackx, B. Jacobs, D. Clarke, and
F. Piessens, “Secure compilation to protected module architectures,”
ACM TOPLAS, 2015.
